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Abstract 
While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many 
instances in daily life, in most laboratory studies, the demand for punishment and reward are 
studied separately from one another. This paper presents the results from an experiment 
measuring the demand for reward and punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties, separately and 
jointly. We find that the demand for costly punishment is substantially lower when individuals 
are also given the ability to reward. Similarly, the demand for costly reward is lower when 
individuals can also punish. The evidence indicates the reason for this is that costly 
punishment and reward are not only used to alter the material payoff of others as assumed by 
recent economic models, but also as a signal of disapproval and approval of others’ actions, 
respectively. When the opportunity exists, subjects often choose to withhold reward as a form 
of costless punishment, and to withhold punishment as a form of costless reward. We 
conclude that restricting the available options to punishing (rewarding) only, may lead to an 
increase in the demand for costly punishment (reward).  
Keywords: punishment, reward, social norms, norm enforcement, third party 
JEL Codes: C91, D03, D63, H41
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1. Introduction 
An important insight from laboratory experiments in the last 30 years is that many 
individuals are willing to incur a cost to punish selfish and reward generous behavior, even in 
one-shot interactions. The propensity to punish has been most clearly demonstrated in 
experiments using the ultimatum game (e.g., Güth et al., 1982), the public good game (e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000), and the third party punishment game (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004). The propensity to reward generous behavior has been illustrated in experiments based 
on the trust game (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) and the gift exchange game (e.g., 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993). The findings from these games have been central to the 
development of new theoretical models in which individuals are assumed to have social 
preferences and thus may be willing to incur a cost to alter the material payoff of other 
individuals.1  
Most laboratory studies allow participants to either punish or reward others. However, in 
many instances in daily life, punishment opportunities coexist alongside reward 
opportunities.2 This raises the question of whether the demand for costly punishment (reward) 
may be affected by the mere existence of reward (punishment) opportunities and, if so, in 
what way. The present study addresses this question by using a game similar to that 
introduced in the literature by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). In the game, an individual 
dictates the division of an endowment between herself and a receiver. A third player must 
decide whether to use part of his endowment to reward or punish the dictator. The demand for 
costly reward and punishment is examined separately and together. Punishing is costly both 
for the third party and for the dictator who receives the punishment. Rewarding is costly for 
the party, but beneficial for the dictator.  
If individuals have preferences over bundles of material payoffs only -- as assumed by 
recent models of social preferences -- the demand for costly punishment (reward) should be 
unaffected by the existence or absence of reward (punishment) opportunities in our 
experiment. Punishment, however, may be more than just a means of altering the material 
payoff of others. Punishment may be used to express disapproval for selfish behavior (e.g., 
Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2005). 
Similarly, reward may be used to express approval for generous behavior. If individuals have 
a preference for expressing their views about the actions of others and they use punishment 
and reward to that end, restricting the options available to them could lead to overestimating 
                                               
1
 As Camerer and Fehr (2004, p. 55, emphasis added) write: “Social preferences refer to how people rank 
different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others.” The willingness to punish or reward may be 
driven by a desire to reduce inequality in payoffs (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or 
a desire to hurt (help) people that have been unkind (kind) (e.g., Cox et al., 2007; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993).  
2
 In online marketplaces such as eBay, for example, traders can leave either positive or negative feedback; 
positive feedback is a form of reward as it allows sellers to charge higher prices, while negative feedback is a 
form of punishment for failing to provide the anticipated level of satisfaction as it lowers the prices sellers can 
charge (Houser and Wooders, 2006). At work, individuals may reward good colleagues by being courteous and 
helpful to them, and punish bad ones by ignoring them or complaining to the employer. 
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the demand for costly punishment and reward. For example, when reward opportunities exist, 
it is possible that some individuals may express their disapproval simply by withholding 
rewards – a costless form of punishment. Even if an individual decides to punish, the demand 
for punishment may be lower as costly punishment may signal greater disapproval when the 
option to withhold reward exists. 
The results from the experiment indicate that the demand for costly punishment is indeed 
substantially higher when rewarding opportunities do not exist. A similar increase is observed 
in the demand for costly reward when punishing is not possible. Evidence from a 
questionnaire indicates that many participants use reward and punishment to signal their 
approval and disapproval of the ‘dictator’s’ transfer. That is, participants do not use 
punishment and reward solely for the purpose of altering the monetary payoff of others. In 
addition, we find that changes in the demand for costly punishment or reward do not affect the 
amount the ‘dictator’ transfers to the receiver, but have a pronounced effect on individual 
earnings in the experiment.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on punishment 
and rewards. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results from 
the experiment. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
The experimental literature on reward and punishment is vast. Most studies have allowed 
participants to either punish or reward others. In this section, we discuss studies that either 
allow both for rewarding and punishing, or examine punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties. 
The focus of all studies in the first category tends to be on the efficacy of costly punishment 
and reward in upholding cooperation rather than the demand for punishment and reward itself 
(e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). We concentrate on the findings related 
to our research question, that is, on the interaction between reward and punishment 
opportunities.  
Ule, Riedl and Cason (2009) examine participants’ willingness to punish in a finitely-
repeated, indirect helping game. At the start of each of the 100 periods, subjects are assigned 
the role of either the donor or the recipient and are then randomly matched in pairs. In each 
period, donors observe the recipient’s recent behavior as a donor in past periods and must 
decide whether to “help” the recipient (i.e., increase her earnings), do nothing, or punish her 
(i.e., reduce her earnings). The authors find that subjects prefer to do nothing rather than 
punish. Rand et al. (2009) study behavior in an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma in 
which subjects can cooperate, defect or punish their partner. They find that subjects are more 
likely to respond to a defection by withholding cooperation in future rounds than by using 
costly punishment. An important feature of both Rand et al. (2009) and Ule et al. (2009) is 
that, unlike in our study, individuals have an incentive to build a good reputation by avoiding 
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the use of costly punishment. This may explain, at least partly, the reduced demand for 
punishment in these studies.  
Three further studies examine punishment in conjunction with other means for enforcing 
cooperation in finitely-repeated, public-good games with fixed groups. Rockenbach and 
Milinski (2006) find that the frequency of costly punishment is significantly reduced if a 
separate stage is added at the end of the public-good game allowing individuals to withhold 
rewards from free riders. However, they also find that the intensity of punishment is higher in 
the presence of reward opportunities. Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007) find that the demand 
for costly punishment is significantly lower in the presence of reward opportunities. Similarly, 
Noussair and Tucker (2005) observe fewer instances of costly punishment when costless 
punishment (both for the enforcer and the norm violator) is available.  
In contrast to these three studies, Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) do not find 
a reduction in the demand for costly punishment in a finitely-repeated, proposer-responder 
game when reward opportunities are introduced. Interestingly, unlike in the previous studies, 
subjects in Andreoni et al. (2003) are randomly rematched in every period of the experiment. 
This suggests that at least part of the reduction in the demand for costly punishment may be 
due to strategic concerns arising from the fixed composition of groups.  
Understanding the relation between reward and punishment can be difficult when the 
game is played repeatedly, even if individuals are randomly rematched in every period. For 
example, Andreoni et al. (2003) find that the introduction of punishment opportunities 
reduces the demand for costly reward. The authors attribute this to the fact that offers were 
significantly higher in the treatment where both punishment and reward opportunities were 
available. As a result, they argue, an offer that may appear worthy of reward in one 
experimental treatment because of the relatively low offers made by others, may not appear to 
be worthy of a reward in another treatment. Therefore, while repeated-game designs may be 
desirable for studying the efficacy of different means in promoting efficiency, a one-shot 
design is better suited for examining the demand for costly punishment and reward, and for 
addressing our research question.3  
In summary, these studies suggest that there could be interaction effects between 
punishment and reward opportunities. However, the experiments were not designed to address 
whether and how the existence of reward opportunities affects the demand for costly 
punishment (and vice versa). In particular, the fact that the game is repeated a number of 
times makes it difficult to understand the reason for the interaction effect. This is the reason 
we decided to use a one-shot design in our experiment.  
                                               
3
 Walker and Halloran (2004) study the demand for costly punishment and rewards in a one-shot public-good 
game. They find that both are equally effective in enforcing cooperation. However, their experimental design 
does not include a treatment with both reward and punishment opportunities. Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010) 
find that subjects prefer using reward than punishment in a finitely-repeated public good game, even though 
punishment is more effective in encouraging cooperation. 
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As a testing ground for our study, we use a modified version of the third-party 
punishment game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). To date, there have been only a handful of 
studies using this game (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr, Hoff and Kshetramade, 2008; 
Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al. 2008). As the name of the game suggests, individuals in 
these studies are only allowed to punish the ‘dictator’, that is, they cannot reward her if she is 
generous. The typical finding in these studies is that the demand for costly punishment 
increases as the ‘dictator’s’ transfer decreases. The only studies we are aware of in which 
third parties can both reward and punish are Charness, Cobo-Reyes and Jimenez (2008) and 
Almenberg et al. (2011). Charness et al. (2008) investigate third-party punishment and reward 
in a ‘trust game’ in which, in some treatments, third parties can punish a selfish responder or 
reward a trusting sender. Therefore, unlike our experiment, punishment and rewards are 
applied to different individuals. Almenberg et al. (2011), in a recent study, similar to our 
experiment, allow third parties to punish and reward the dictator. The authors investigate 
whether the actions of the third party are sensitive to the number of players affected by the 
behavior of the dictator, and not whether there is an interaction between reward and 
punishment opportunities. Therefore, unlike in our experiment, they do not examine behavior 
in treatments where there are either punishment or reward opportunities only.  
3. Experimental design 
The experiment uses a three-player game similar to that introduced by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004). We examine behavior in three treatments which differ only with respect 
to the actions available to the third party (Player C).  
3.1 Treatment PR 
Treatment PR is our baseline treatment as it allows both for punishing and rewarding. The 
game in this treatment is as follows. Player A is given an endowment of 100 ECUs 
(Experimental Currency Units) and must decide how much of it she wishes to transfer to 
Player B, . Player B has no endowment or any decision to make. Player C 
receives an endowment of 65 ECUs. He can use his endowment to either punish or reward 
Player A for her transfer (hence the name of the treatment). C’s endowment is private 
information.4  
In order to punish, Player C must purchase punishment points, . Each 
punishment point costs Player C 1 ECU and reduces Player A’s earnings by 2 ECUs. 
Similarly, in order to reward, Player C must purchase reward points, . Reward 
                                               
4
 In Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) it was common knowledge that Player C was given 50 ECU. This amount 
reinforces the salience of the equal split between A and B (which the authors refer to as “the distribution norm”). 
We decided to endow Player C with an amount larger than 50 ECU, as an endowment of 50 implies that, unless 
Player A gives more than 50 ECU to Player B, A will earn more than Player C. Rewarding would therefore 
increase the earnings difference between A and C, while punishing would reduce it. We kept the endowment of 
65 ECU to Player C private so as not to undermine the saliency of the equal split as a potential benchmark for 
judging which transfers are generous and which are selfish (McDonald et al., 2012).  
{0,10,20,...,100}t ∈
{0,1,..., 65}tp ∈
{0,1,...,65}tr ∈
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points cost 1 ECU and increase Player A’s earnings by 2 ECUs. Player C can either reward or 
punish Player A for a given transfer, therefore, if  > 0 then = 0 for a given t, and vice 
versa.5 The earnings of player A are given by: 
 .       (1)  
Player B’s earnings are given by: 
.          (2) 
Player C’s earnings are given by: 
.        (3) 
Equations (1) and (2) are common knowledge amongst participants as are the 
implications of reward and punishment for Players A and C, and the fact that the game is 
played only once. Note that it is possible that Player A could have negative earnings, in which 
case money was deducted from the $5 show-up fee subjects received.  
Player C made his decision using the strategy method. This means that Player C had to 
state whether he would like to reward or punish Player A for each possible level of transfer 
and before finding out what A’s transfer was. The responses were incentive compatible as 
Player C would pay for any points assigned for the transfer level Player A actually chose.  
There are three reasons for using the strategy method. First, it allows us to collect more 
data per individual thus helping us to better understand the motivation behind individual 
decisions. Second, it guarantees that we will be able to compare the enforcement decisions 
across treatments, even if transfers by Player A differ. Third, using the strategy method allows 
us to compare our results with those reported in previous studies using the third-party 
punishment game.6  
3.2 Treatment P 
The game in Treatment P is identical to that played in treatment PR with one difference. 
Similar to previous experiments, in treatment P, Player C could only punish Player A but not 
reward her. To keep decision costs as similar as possible to those in treatment PR, using the 
strategy method, Player C was asked to enter the number of punishment points he wished to 
assign into a first box and then was asked to confirm his decision by typing the same number 
into a second box, for each of the eleven transfer levels. Thus, Player C made 22 entries, as in 
treatment PR. 
 
                                               
5
 The experimental instructions were adapted from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and use neutral language. 
Punishment points were referred to as subtraction points and reward points as addition points. The instructions 
are available at https://sites.google.com/site/nnikiforakis/.   
6
 Brandts and Charness (2011) present a survey of the existing evidence on the impact of the strategy method. 
They report that the treatment effects obtained when using the strategy method are consistent with those obtained 
when using the direct-response method.  
tr tp
100 2( )A t tt r ppi = − + −
 
B tpi =
65 ( )C t tp rpi = − +
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3.3 Treatment R 
The R treatment is the same as the PR treatment except that Player C can only reward 
Player A. As in treatment P, to keep decision costs similar to those in treatment PR, Player C 
was asked to enter the number of reward points they wished to assign into a first box and then 
was asked to confirm this decision. Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.  
3.4 Subject pool and procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the 
University of Melbourne using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited through a 
database of more than 2,500 volunteers using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). A total of 327 
individuals took part in the experiment. All participants were students at the University of 
Melbourne with different academic backgrounds (excluding students from psychology or 
those that had completed their first year in economics). Each individual participated in only 
one treatment. Participants had not previously participated in an experiment involving 
punishment or reward.  
The experiment was conducted in two ‘waves’. 222 subjects participated in the first wave 
of the experiment. We decided to run a second wave with 105 subjects to include additional 
questions in the post-experiment questionnaire about whether punishment/reward reflected 
individuals’ disapproval/approval. In the second wave, all individuals not assigned the role of 
Player A used the strategy method to decide how many points they would assign to Player A 
if they were allocated the role of Player C. It was common knowledge that Player Cs would 
be randomly selected after all participants made their decisions. This change does not affect 
incentives in the game. We also aimed to collect the same number of observations for each 
treatment in each wave. In our analysis, we control for the procedure used to elicit the 
decisions by Player C. Our results regarding treatment effects are the same across the two 
waves.  
The smallest experimental session had 12 subjects participating, while the six largest 
sessions had 30 subjects participating. Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were seated in 
partitioned cubicles and were randomly divided into groups – group composition was not 
revealed to subjects. At the same time, subjects were randomly allocated the role of either 
Player A, B or C and received player-specific instructions.7 The instructions included control 
questions to ensure that all subjects understood the game. Before the experiment began, the 
experimenter read a summary of the instructions. After the experiment ended, subjects 
                                               
7
 In the second wave, participants not assigned the role of Player A received a set of instructions that explained 
the roles of Player B and C. These participants were asked to make the decision of Player C using the strategy 
method and were then randomly allocated the role of either Player B or Player C at the end of the experiment. 
We decided to have all participants not assigned the role of Player A make punishment/reward decisions so that 
we have a larger sample of participants who would answer the punishment/reward questions in the post-
experiment questionnaire.  
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answered a short questionnaire that included sociodemographic questions and asked how they 
made their decisions in the experiment.  
Sessions lasted on average 40 minutes, including instruction time. On average, 
participants earned 23.20 Australian Dollars including a $5 show-up fee. The exchange rate 
between ECU and the Australian Dollar was 1 ECU = 35 Australian cents. This meant that the 
stakes were not trivial as Player A’s endowment was $35 and C’s endowment was 22.75 
Australian Dollars. At the time of the experiment, the minimum hourly wage in Australia was 
$14.31. The exchange rate between the Australian and U.S. Dollar was approximately one.  
3.5 Hypotheses 
We first discuss the prediction for our game under the joint assumption that each player is 
maximizing his/her earnings and that this is common knowledge. Since punishing and 
rewarding is costly, the trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibrium is that Player C will neither 
punish nor reward Player A, and that the latter will make a zero transfer to B. The prediction 
is the same across all treatments. While this assumption seems unrealistic and the 
corresponding Nash equilibrium is known to be a poor predictor of behavior in games such as 
ours, it is nevertheless widely used in the literature. We thus present it for completeness. 
Recently, economic models have emerged providing different explanations for the 
willingness of people to punish selfish and reward generous behavior. These models assume 
that individuals have social preferences (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox et al., 2007; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993) and thus may be willing to sacrifice part 
of their income to alter the material payoff of others. While there are numerous differences 
across these models, all of them predict that (i) punishment (reward) should increase 
(decrease) as Player A’s transfer decreases, and (ii) behavior should be the same across 
treatments in our experiment. The intuition for the latter is simple. Individuals in these models 
are assumed to have preferences over different (material) payoff allocations to themselves and 
others.8 Punishment and reward are simply means for altering material payoffs. Whether an 
individual will reduce the earnings of another participant and the amount of the reduction 
does not depend on whether the individual also has the option to increase the earnings of the 
other player.  
                                               
8
 Some models, such as Cox et al. (2007) and Rabin (1993), allow for these preferences to depend on the 
intentions of the other player. An action is judged to be kind or unkind and, hence, worthy of reward or 
punishment, according to a reference material payoff. In Rabin (1993, p.1286), for example, player j determines 
the kindness of player i by comparing his payoff (πj) to the “equitable payoff”. The equitable payoff is defined as 
the average of the highest and lowest possible payoff that j could earn. Notice that Rabin’s definition considers 
reciprocity between two players: i and j. A plausible adaptation of this assumption for our game is that Player C 
judges A’s kindness by comparing the latter’s payoff (πA) to the average of the highest and lowest possible 
payoff that Player B could earn. Reward and punishment do not affect the earnings of Player B, but could affect 
those of Player A.  However, recall that C’s endowment is private information. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
C’s judgment of A’s kindness would be affected by the presence of reward/punishment opportunities in our 
experiment. We provide evidence that this is indeed the case in section 4.4. 
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As mentioned previously, recent evidence suggests that individuals may use punishment 
not only to alter the material payoffs of others, but also to signal their disapproval of a selfish 
action (e.g., Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 
2005). When reward opportunities exist, individuals can signal their disapproval without 
incurring a cost by simply withholding reward. In this case, a punishment p may reflect 
stronger disapproval when reward opportunities are not restricted. Therefore, if individuals 
use punishment to express disapproval, controlling for the level of transfer, third parties will 
demand less costly punishment when reward opportunities exist.  
Hypothesis 1:  The demand for costly punishment will be higher when reward opportunities 
are restricted.  
Similarly, it seems possible that individuals may use reward to signal their approval of 
generous actions. When punishment opportunities exist, individuals can signal their approval 
without incurring a cost by withholding punishment. In this case, a reward r may reflect 
stronger approval when punishment opportunities are not restricted. Therefore, if individuals 
use reward to express approval, controlling for the level of transfer, third parties will demand 
less costly reward when punishment opportunities exist.  
Hypothesis 2:  The demand for costly reward will be higher when punishment opportunities 
are restricted.  
Note that we do not offer a hypothesis for the impact that our treatments will have on the 
level of transfer by Player A. The reason is that, while the investment in costly 
punishment/reward is anticipated to be lower in PR relative to P and R, some studies have 
shown that even costless punishment may induce cooperative behavior (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2008; Masclet et al. 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2009). Therefore, the reduction in 
the demand for costly punishment and reward may not necessarily lead to lower levels of 
norm adherence.  
4. Results 
4.1 The demand for costly punishment  
Figure 1 presents the demand for costly punishment as a function of Player A’s transfer. 
As in previous experiments, we find that as transfers to Player B increase, third parties 
purchase fewer punishment points in both treatments. While transfers above 50 ECUs receive 
small amounts of punishment, something also observed in previous experiments (e.g., Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004), as can be seen in Table A1 in the appendix, the punishment of 
transfers greater than 40 ECUs is not significantly different from zero in either of the 
treatments. 
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Figure 1 provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. As can be seen, there is a 
substantial reduction in the demand for costly punishment in the PR treatment relative to the P 
treatment. On average, subjects assigned 3.13 punishment points in treatment P and 1.80 in 
PR, a reduction of 42.5 percent. The difference is statistically significant using the average 
number of points assigned by an individual across transfers as an independent observation 
(Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0.03).  
Table 2 presents a regression analysis of costly punishment. The dependent variable is the 
number of points individual i assigned for a transfer t, pit. Given the patterns observed in 
Figure 1 punishment is modeled as a linear function of transfers.9 The regression also includes 
a treatment dummy (PR) and a control for whether the observations are taken from the first or 
second experimental wave. Further, given that each Player C makes 11 decisions, we include 
random effects at the individual level.  
The coefficients for the constant in (1) and (2) indicate that Player C assigned 7.19 
punishment points to Player A in treatment P and 3.57 points in treatment PR for a transfer of 
zero. The Transfer coefficients in (1) and (2) estimate the change in the demand for costly 
punishment by third parties when Player A transfers 10 more ECUs to Player B in treatments 
P and PR, respectively. The Transfer coefficient estimates from (1) and (2) are significant and 
negative indicating that an increase in the amount transferred by Player A reduces the 
punishment from third parties. The reduction is smaller in PR than in P as can be seen by the 
significant, positive coefficient of PR*Transfer in column (3). We provide an explanation for 
this finding in section 4.4. The negative, significant coefficient for PR in column (3) provides 
additional evidence for the significant reduction in the demand for costly punishment. 
Therefore, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.10  
What causes the reduction in the demand for costly punishment? Is it that fewer people 
assign punishment points when reward opportunities exist? Is it that people assign fewer 
points? Or is it both?11 In treatment P, 59 percent of subjects punished at least one transfer (29 
out of 49), while in treatment PR only 37 percent of subjects did the same (18 out of 49). 
                                               
9
 We follow previous studies in reporting results from linear regressions with individual random effects as this 
simplifies the interpretation of the coefficients. Tobit regressions yield qualitatively the same results both for 
punishment and reward. The results are also robust if we only use observations in which transfers were less or 
equal to 50 ECU for punishment, and greater or equal to 30 ECU for reward (see below).  
10
 The Wave coefficient is similar in both P and PR. This suggests that there was more punishment on average in 
the second wave of experiments than the first. While this may be a result worthy of further investigation, for our 
purposes, what is most important is that when an interaction variable PR*WAVE is included in the regressions, 
we find that it is insignificant (p-value=0.90). Thus, our treatment effects are unaffected by this parameter. We 
also tried including additional socio-demographic characteristics in regression (3) to check the robustness of our 
results. When Age, Economics [major] and Gender variables are included in the estimation, our results are 
unaffected.  
11  One may wonder whether the reduced demand for costly punishment could be due to subjects switching from 
punishing to rewarding. This is not the case however, as can be easily seen by examining the demand for 
punishing transfers of zero in Figure 1. Such transfers are almost never rewarded. Also, if this explanation was 
behind the reduction in the demand for costly punishment, we would expect that the demand for points (either 
reward or punishment points) should be at least as high in treatment PR as in P. However, controlling for the 
level of transfer this is almost never the case.  
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Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2 disaggregate the demand for costly punishment using a hurdle 
model. The likelihood of punishment is modeled separately from the severity of punishment 
conditional on punishment occurring (Nikiforakis, 2008). As can be seen in column (4), an 
increase in the transfer by Player A reduces significantly the probability that he will be 
punished. The probability of punishment is significantly lower in treatment PR. While the 
amount of points assigned is smaller in PR (column 5), the reduction is far from being 
significant. We therefore conclude: 
Result 1: Controlling for the transfer by Player A, the demand for costly punishment is 42.5 
percent lower when reward opportunities exist. This difference is significant and is driven by 
the reduced number of individuals punishing when reward opportunities exist.  
4.2 The demand for costly reward 
Figure 2 presents the demand for costly reward as a function of Player A’s transfer. The 
figure illustrates that individuals purchase more reward points as transfers to Player B 
increase in both treatments. Transfers of less than 20 ECUs receive small rewards, but as can 
be seen in Table A1 in the appendix, rewards are not significantly different from zero for 
transfers less than 30 ECUs in R and less than 50 ECUs in PR.  
Figure 2 shows that, in line with Hypothesis 2, the demand for costly reward in treatment 
PR is lower than in treatment P. On average, subjects assigned 3.81 reward points in PR and 
4.95 in R, a reduction of 23 percent. The difference is statistically significant using the 
average number of points assigned by an individual across transfers as an independent 
observation (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed; p-value = 0.03).  
Table 3 presents a regression analysis of costly reward similar to that for punishment in 
the previous section. The dependent variable is the number of reward points individual i 
assigned for a transfer t, rit. Reward is modeled as a linear function of transfers. We also 
include a treatment dummy (PR) in column (3) and a control for whether the observations are 
taken from the first or second experimental wave. Given that each Player C makes 11 
decisions, we include random effects at the individual level.  
The Transfer coefficients in columns (1) and (2) capture the change in the demand for 
costly reward as Player A transfers 10 more ECUs to Player B in treatments R and PR, 
respectively. The Transfer coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (2) are significant and 
positive indicating that an increase in the transfer by Player A increases the reward received, 
in both treatments. The insignificant constants in the same regressions indicate that a transfer 
of zero was not significantly rewarded. The negative, significant coefficient for PR*Transfer 
in column (3) indicates that the demand for costly reward is lower in treatment PR. We 
therefore conclude that we cannot reject Hypothesis 2.12  
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 The Wave variable is insignificant as can be seen in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. This indicates that the 
demand for reward was the same in both waves of the experiment. When an interaction variable PR*WAVE is 
included in the regressions it is insignificant for all treatments (p-value>0.5). We also tested the robustness of 
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Columns (4) and (5) in Table 3 present the results from the hurdle model for rewards. The 
negative, significant coefficient of PR in column (4) and the insignificant coefficient of PR in 
column (5) indicate that the reduction in the demand for costly reward is due to a reduction in 
the number of individuals who are willing to reward and not due to a reduction in the size of 
the reward. In treatment R, 70 percent of subjects rewarded at least one transfer (32 out of 
46). In contrast, in treatment PR, only 45 percent of the subjects rewarded once or more times 
(22 out of 49). We therefore conclude:  
Result 2: Controlling for the transfer by Player A, the demand for costly reward is 23 percent 
lower when punishment opportunities exist. This difference is significant and is driven by the 
reduced number of individuals rewarding when punishment opportunities exist.  
4.3 Costly and costless punishment/reward 
Since Player C's endowment is private information, as mentioned, we have no prior 
reason to believe that the existence of punishment/reward opportunities should affect the 
interpretation of the generosity of a given transfer: a transfer of 0 (100) ECU should be 
considered equally selfish (generous) in all treatments. How do we then explain the fact that 
individuals who transferred 0 (100) ECU received less punishment (reward) points in 
treatment PR than in treatment P (R)? More precisely, how can we explain the fact that 
punishment appeared to be less sensitive to changes in transfers in Table 2? 
So far, the analysis has considered solely the demand for costly punishment and reward. 
However, as we saw, third parties appear to withhold reward as a form of costless 
punishment. Therefore, to evaluate the sensitivity of third parties to changes in transfers, we 
need to take into consideration both costly and costless punishment.13  
Figure 3 presents the average change in the earnings of Player A that Player C caused in 
each treatment. As can be seen, for transfers less or equal to 50, the slope of the lines in 
treatments P and PR is very similar.14 Using a linear regression with individual random effects 
and the same independent variables as in the third column of Table 2, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the slopes are the same for offers less or equal to 50 ECU (p-value=0.116). 
This implies that, as offers decrease from 50 ECU, the change that Player C caused to the 
earnings of Player A is the same across treatments P and PR. In other words, the existence of 
reward opportunities does not affect the extent of punishment when one takes into account the 
amount of reward withheld. 
Figure 3 also shows that, for transfers greater or equal to 50, the slope of the lines in 
treatments R and PR is similar. Using again a linear regression with individual random effects 
and the same independent variables as in the third column of Table 2, we fail to reject the 
                                                                                                                                                   
our result by controlling for different socio-demographic characteristics. Controlling for Age, Economics [major] 
and Gender does not affect our results. 
13
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee and the co-editor (Jacob Goeree) for suggesting this analysis.  
14
 Recall from Table A1 that transfers lower than 50 ECU attracted a significant number of punishment points. 
Thus, transfers of 50 ECU can be used as a baseline to evaluate Player C's reaction to the choice of Player A.   
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hypothesis that the slopes are the same for offers greater or equal to 50 ECU (p-
value=0.992).15 This implies that as offers progressively increase from 50 ECU, the change 
that Player C caused to the earnings of Player A is the same across treatments R and PR. This 
implies that the presence of punishment opportunities does not affect the extent of reward 
when taking into account the amount of punishment withheld.  
Result 3: The marginal incentives of Player A are unaffected by the existence of punishment 
or reward opportunities. 
4.4 Costly reward and punishment as signals of approval and disapproval 
Why does the introduction of reward opportunities reduce the demand for costly 
punishment? Why does the existence of punishment opportunities reduce the demand for 
costly reward? The critical assumption underlying Hypotheses 1 and 2 is that individuals use 
costly enforcement to signal their approval or disapproval. Our inability to reject hypotheses 1 
and 2 provides indirect support for this assumption. In this section, we present evidence 
providing direct support for this assumption.  
In the post-experiment questionnaire in the second wave of experiments, subjects in 
treatments P and PR (48 in total) were asked to nominate how many punishment points they 
would assign to Player A if they strongly disapproved of Player A’s transfer to Player B. 
Similarly, subjects in treatments R and PR (46 in total) were asked how many reward points 
they would assign if they strongly approved of Player A’s transfer. If costly reward and 
punishment are used to signal approval and disapproval respectively, we would expect to see 
a positive correlation between subjects’ responses and the number of points they assigned in 
the experiment. 
Figure 4 plots the number of punishment points assigned in the experiment by Player C to 
Player A, when the latter transferred nothing to B, against the number of points Player C said 
she would assign if she strongly disapproved of A’s transfer to B. Figure 5 plots the number 
of reward points assigned by Player C in the experiment if A transferred 100 ECU to B, 
against the number of points C said she would assign to signal strong approval. As can be 
seen in both figures, there is a clear positive correlation between the plotted variables (p-
value<0.05, for all cases). This evidence supports the assumption that individuals use 
punishments to signal disapproval for violating the norm and rewards to signal approval for 
adhering to the norm. The availability of reward (punishment) opportunities allows 
individuals to signal their disapproval (approval) by not rewarding (punishing) rather than by 
demanding costly punishment.  
Result 4: The number of points assigned by Player C in the experiment is highly and 
positively correlated with the number of points participants stated they would assign, if they 
strongly approved/disapproved of a transfer by Player A. 
                                               
15
 The difference remains insignificant if we consider transfers greater or equal to 30 ECU (p-value=0.976). 
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4.5 Transfers by Player A and earnings 
The average transfer by Player A is 13 ECUs in treatment P, 15.7 ECUs in treatment R, 
and 17.3 ECUs in treatment PR. Using the transfer of each Player A as an independent 
observation, we find that none of the pairwise comparisons is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney, two-tailed, p-value>0.22). The fact that the demand for costly reward and 
punishment differs across treatments together with the fact that transfers norm adherence is 
unaffected by our treatments, raises the question of how earnings – a measure of efficiency – 
differ across treatments. Individual earnings are highest in treatment R, followed by treatment 
PR and treatment P. On average, individuals earned 55.5 ECU in R, 53.7 ECU in PR and 46.4 
ECU in P. Using the average earnings in a group as an independent observation, we find that 
earnings in PR are significantly higher than they are in P (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p-
value<0.01) and significantly lower than they are in R (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p-
value=0.03).  
Using the actual earnings as a measure of efficiency in our experiment can be misleading 
as participants assigned the role of Player A could have been matched with a different Player 
C, which could have led to substantially different earnings. In order to get a better idea of how 
earnings differ across treatments, we calculated the average change in the earnings of a Player 
A given his transfer and the average reduction/increase for that level of transfer in the 
treatment. The average change in earnings given the distribution of transfers was - 15.60 in P, 
- 4.08 in PR and + 3.30 in R. This implies that while the introduction of reward opportunities 
increases earnings in our experiment, the introduction of punishment opportunities reduces 
earnings.  
Result 5: Transfers are not significantly different across treatments. However, there is a 
significant difference in earnings, with earnings being highest in treatment R, followed by PR 
and then P. 
5. Concluding remarks 
We studied the demand for costly reward and punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties 
and found a strong interaction effect between the two. In particular, the demand for costly 
punishment is greatly reduced when reward opportunities exist. Similarly, the demand for 
costly reward is reduced in the presence of punishment opportunities. These findings suggest 
that punishment and reward are more than just means for altering the material payoffs of 
others as assumed by models of social preferences. Participants appear to have a preference 
for expressing disapproval and approval, and use punishment and reward opportunities to that 
end. When punishment opportunities are restricted, individuals can only signal their approval 
by using costly reward. Similarly, when reward opportunities are restricted, individuals can 
only signal their disapproval by using costly punishment, whereas when reward opportunities 
exist many individuals signal their disapproval by withholding reward.  
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Our study contributes to a recent discussion about the relatively low frequency with 
which costly punishment is observed outside the laboratory (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 
2012; Guala, 2011) and the efficiency of costly punishment in promoting cooperation (e.g., 
Gächter et al., 2008; Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2012). Previous studies have identified 
factors that may influence negatively the willingness to use costly punishment such as the risk 
of counter-punishment (e.g., Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Denant-Boermont et al., 2007; 
Nikiforakis, 2008) and the preference of some individuals to avoid inflicting harm on norm 
violators (e.g. Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). Our findings suggest another 
explanation, namely, that individuals use different means to signal their disapproval such as 
withholding rewards, and may thus not engage in costly punishment.  This is consistent with 
Dellarocas and Woods (2008) who find that many disappointed buyers on eBay prefer not to 
leave positive feedback rather than to leave negative feedback. Our evidence also suggests 
that the absence of reward opportunities in most experiments may exacerbate the inefficiency 
of costly punishment as a mechanism for enforcing cooperation in daily life.  
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Figure 1 – The demand for costly punishment  
 
Figure 2 – The demand for costly reward 
 
The figures do not include observations from four subjects (ID: 263, 445, 462, and 499). The subjects are included in the statistical analysis, but excluded 
here to offer a more accurate representation of behavior in the experiment. The responses of these subjects to a post-experiment questionnaire suggest that 
they were confused. The choices of these subjects can be seen in figures A1 and A2. 
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Figure 3 – Average change in Player A's earnings across treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
20
-
10
0
10
20
Av
e
ra
ge
 
ch
a
n
ge
 
in
 
Pl
ay
e
r 
A'
s 
ea
rn
in
gs
0 20 40 60 80 10010 30 50 70 90
Transfer
P PR
R
20 
 
Figure 4 – Does punishment signal disapproval? 
 
Figure 5 – Does reward signal approval? 
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Table 1 - Experimental Design 
Treatment Punishment Reward # of participants 
PR Yes Yes 111 
P Yes No 111 
R No Yes 105 
 
 
Table 2 – The Demand for Costly Punishment  
  P PR Both 
Punishment 
Decision  
Punishment 
Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Transfer -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.28*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) 
PR   -3.64*** -1.39** -2.26 
   (0.95) (0.54) (2.70) 
PR * Transfer   0.05*** 0.00 0.05 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Wave 1.91 1.84* 1.88** 1.26** 2.19 
 (1.19) (1.07) (0.80) (0.51) (2.45) 
Constant 7.19*** 3.57*** 7.20*** -3.85 17.00*** 
  (0.91) (0.84) (0.79) (0.46) (2.22) 
Observations 539 539 1078 1078 191 
No of subjects 49 49 98 98 46 
 (1) – (3) and (5) are linear regressions and the dependent variable is the number of points Player C assigned to Player A; (4) 
is a probit regression and the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Player C punished A for a transfer t and 0 otherwise; in 
(5) the dependent variable is truncated at zero; all regressions include individual random effects; observations from three 
individuals are dropped in regression (5) as they were outliers, however, adding them in the analysis does not affect 
qualitatively our results; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3 – The Demand for Costly Reward  
  P PR Both 
Reward 
Decision  
Reward 
Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Transfer 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.23*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
PR   0.58 -1.88** 4.69 
   (1.52) (0.89) (3.01) 
PR * Transfer   -0.03*** -0.00 -0.04 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Wave -0.08 1.06 0.51 0.85 -0.41 
 (1.82) (2.16) (1.41) (0.75) (2.34) 
Constant -0.56 -0.52 -0.83 -4.03*** -5.80 
  (1.31) (1.57) (1.28) (0.74) (2.13) 
Observations 506 539 1045 1045 331 
No of subjects 46 49 95 95 51 
(1) – (3) are linear regressions and (5) are linear regressions and the dependent variable is the number of points Player C 
assigned to Player A; (4) is a probit regression and the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Player C rewarded A for a 
transfer t and 0 otherwise; in (5) the dependent variable is truncated at zero; all regressions include individual random 
effects; observations from three individuals are dropped in regression (5) as they were outliers, however, adding them in the 
analysis does not affect qualitatively our results; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% 
level.  
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Appendix  
Table A1  
Treatment Punishment  Reward 
 P PR Both R PR Both 
0-transfer 10.45*** 5.63*** 10.45***    
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08)    
10-transfer 7.92*** 4.43*** 7.92*** 0.44 0.12 0.44 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
20-transfer 5.86*** 3.37*** 5.86*** 1.07 0.02 1.07 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
30-transfer 3.84*** 1.94* 3.84*** 1.74* 0.94 1.74** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
40-transfer 2.53** 2.29** 2.53** 2.39** 0.59 2.39** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
50-transfer 1.43 0.45 1.43 4.17*** 1.88 4.17*** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
60-transfer 0.67 0.33 0.67 5.11*** 2.29* 5.11*** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
70-transfer 0.49 1.14 0.49 7.02*** 3.31** 7.02*** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
80-transfer 0.23 0.20 0.23 7.96*** 5.35*** 7.96*** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
90-transfer -0.11 0.00 -0.11 9.02*** 6.57*** 9.02*** 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
100-transfer    10.70*** 7.14*** 10.70*** 
    (1.03) (1.27) (1.18) 
PR   -0.10   0.81 
   (1.31)   (1.79) 
PR*0-transfer   -4.82***    
   (1.31)    
PR*10-transfer   -3.49**   -0.31 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*20-transfer   -2.59**   -1.05 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*30-transfer   -1.90   -0.80 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*40-transfer   -0.25   -1.80 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*50-transfer   -0.98   -2.30 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*60-transfer   -0.35   -2.82* 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*70-transfer   0.65   -3.72** 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*80-transfer   -0.02   -2.61 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*90-transfer   0.10   -2.45 
   (1.31)   (1.65) 
PR*100-transfer      -3.55** 
      (1.65) 
Constant 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.44 1.25 0.44 
 (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (1.14) (1.37) (1.29) 
Observations 539 539 1078 506 539 1045 
Individuals 49 49 98 46 49 95 
Coefficient estimates are the number of points Player C assigned to Player A at a particular transfer level relative to the baseline transfer of 
100 ECUs for punishment and the baseline transfer of 0 ECUs for reward. Random effects are accounted for at the individual level. Standard 
errors  are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level,  Note that these coefficients are 
marginally insignificant with p-value = 0.12 for both.  
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Figure A1 – The Demand for Costly Punishment by Individual 
 
Figure A2 - The Demand for Costly Reward by Individual  
 
The first digit in each subfigure indicates the treatment in which the individual participated (1= Treatment P; 2= Treatment PR; 3=Treatment 
R). The number after the comma is a unique subject ID. The dashed lines help separate visually subjects belonging to a different treatment.   
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